Existing records for these fifty years are much more voluminous, and in
several important respects more satisfactory, than for the preceding
half-century. They include several general reports of secular and missionary
authorities, with statistical information that is comparatively complete. They
throw much light on the mission system, on the condition of the pueblo Indians,
on the Franciscan friars and their controversy with governor and alcaldes mayores, on the commerce and other industries of the
province; but these and other general topics will be detached from the
chronologic narrative and presented in a later part of this chapter. As to the
series of happenings from year to year—the succession of rulers, campaigns
against the various gentile tribes, the neverending question of Moqui conversion, and occasional complaints of impending ruin, with
corresponding projects by which it might be averted—both events and the record
are as before somewhat fragmentary and meagre, though there is little reason to
fear that any momentous occurrence has been buried in oblivion.
Governor Cachupin marched against the
Comanches in 1751, setting fire to a tular into which he had driven 145 of the foe, killing 101
and capturing the rest. This elicited commendation from the viceroy and was
reported to the king. It may be well, however, to bear in mind that according
to the friars, who were particularly bitter against Cachupin,
the governor’s reports of Indian campaigns had often no foundation in fact. At
the end of his five years’ term in 1754, Don Tomás was succeeded by Don
Francisco Antonio Marin del Valle, who perhaps served ad interim by the
viceroy’s appointment, and who was also cordially hated by the padres. In 1755
Padre Rodríguez de la Torre, with a small party of neophytes, visited the Moqui
towns, being well received and permitted to preach; but whenever the masses
showed any sign of yielding to his persuasions a ‘cacique endemoniado’
would rise to talk on the other side. The padres were good men, he said, but
his people were too sensible and strong to become slaves of the alcaldes.
The leading event of Valle’s rule was the visit of Bishop Tamaron of Durango, who at the different settlements
confirmed 11,271 persons, besides 2,973 in the district of El Paso. The visita was from April to July of 1760,
and met no opposition on the part of the missionaries. Later in the same
year Mateo Antonio de Mendoza acted as governor for a few months, and in 1761-2
the position was held by Manuel Portillo Urrisola.
Don Manuel distinguished himself, if we take his word for it, by killing 400
Comanches in a fight at Taos in December 1761. The governor had hoped that this
victory would settle the Comanche question and strike terror to all gentile
raiders; but was disappointed at finding his successor averse to energetic and
warlike methods, and the country consequently not yet saved.
That successor, who took command on the 1st of February, 1762, was no other that Cachupin, who, despite the
bitter opposition of the Franciscans, had been appointed by the king for a new
term. During this second rule of five years Don Tomás sent a party to search
for mines in the San Juan and Gunnison regions of what was later Colorado,
attended to the routine duties of his position, and waged legal warfare on
certain Indians accused of witchcraft at Abiquiú, the
whole affair presenting a striking picture of silly superstition—on the part of
the Spaniards. In 1766 the Marqués de Rubí visited
New Mexico in his tour as inspector of frontier presidios.
Colonel Pedro Fermin de Mendinueta succeeded Cachupin as governor and captain-general—being the last to
hold the latter title—in 1767. In that year there was a great flood at Santa Fé
in October, the course of the river being turned into the Rio Chiquito and threatening the safety of the public
buildings. Against this ruler and his successors I
have found no complaints from the missionaries. In 1771 he announced the
conclusion of a treaty with the Comanches on the 3d of February; and the
viceroy, replying with thanks, called for a report on the condition and needs
of the province, which was furnished in March 1772. Mendinueta declared that the force of 80 soldiers at Santa Fé was not sufficient to
protect so broad a territory, raided by savage foes from every side. True,
there were about 250 men capable of bearing arms among the settlers, besides
the pueblo Indians; but these were poorly supplied with weapons,
and could not leave their homes unprotected to engage in distant
campaigns. The governor’s proposed remedy was a new presidio at Taos, and an
enforced law requiring the Spaniards to live in compact pueblos like the
Indians.
The subject of northern frontier defences received much attention in these years, and in 1772-3 the new reglamento de presidios was published. The only change ordered in New Mexico proper was the detachment of
thirty soldiers from Santa Fé to join thirty citizen auxiliaries from El Paso,
forming a garrison at Robledo, which was to protect the route up the river and
serve as a base for reestablishing the ruined pueblos of Senecti,
Socorro, Alamillo, and Sevilleta. For the protection
of El Paso the militia was to be organized, the presidial company being transferred to Carrizal on the frontier
of Nueva Vizcaya. Nothing of all this was carried into effect, except the
transfer of the presidio—or of the main force, a detachment being always or
generally stationed at El Paso—the governor very properly protesting
against the division of the force at Santa Fé, and some convenient
excuse being always ready for failure to organize the militia.
The conquest or conversion of the Moquis was a matter still
kept in view, though for about twenty years no practical efforts in that
direction are recorded, down to 1774-6, when the project was revived in connection
with the California expeditions from Sonora. Captain Juan Bautista de Anzamade an experimental or exploring trip by way of the
Gila to California in 1774; and it was desired that in connection with his
second expedition the region between the Gila and Moqui towns should be
explored. This region had not been traversed since the time of Coronado in
1540-3, except by Oñate, whose journey was
practically forgotten. The country and its people were wrapped in mystery, and were the objects of much curiosity and
theorizing. To find a way to Moqui was deemed important, especially as it was
proposed, if possible, to occupy the Gila valley and some of its branches. The
New Mexican friars were called upon for their views, and Padre Escalante
developed much enthusiasm on the subject. In June 1775, or possibly 1774, he
spent eight days in the Moqui towns, trying in vain to reach the Rio Grande de Cosninas beyond. In a report to the governor he gave a description of the pueblos—where he found 7,494 souls, two thirds of
them at Oraibe, in seven pueblos on three separate
mesas—and his ideas of what should be done. He earnestly
recommended—subsequently writing to his superior a long argument in support of
his position—that the Moquis should be reduced by force of arms and a presidio
established there. The Moquinos, he said, were well
disposed, but their chiefs had determined not to give up their power, not only
keeping their own people from submission, but the Cosninas as well, who were eager to be Christians. As to the routes, Escalante thought
from what he could learn by Indian reports that the way from Terrenate by the Gila and thence north to Zuñi would not be very difficult; that the central route
from the Colorado to Moqui would probably be found impracticable; but that the
best of all was one leading from Monterey eastward in a nearly direct line to
Santa Fé.
Alas for the good padre’s geographic theories! In 1776, with a party of
nine, including Padre Francisco Atanasio Dominguez,
he attempted to reach Monterey from Santa Fé by the northern route. This tour
belongs mainly to the annals of Utah and Colorado, as recorded in other
volumes. The explorers reached Utah Lake and thus accomplished results that
should make their names famous; but fortunately—else they could not have lived
to tell the story—when on the approach of winter provisions became scarce and
the natives showed no knowledge of Spaniards in the west, lots were cast, and
fate decided that the journey to Monterey should be postponed. Accordingly,
they returned south-eastward, forded the Colorado, came to the Moqui towns, and
returned to Santa Fé. The Moquinos, though furnishing
food and shelter, would not receive presents. A meeting was held to discuss
submission, but while willing to be friends of the Spaniards, the people
proudly refused to be subjects or Christians, preferring to ‘go with the
majority’ and be gentiles, as the traditions of their fathers directed them.
Not only did Escalante fail to demonstrate the merits of his favorite northern
route, but earlier in the same year the central one was proved to be
practicable; and this, so far as the Moqui question was concerned, was the only
result of Anza’s California expedition. Padre Francisco Garcés,
leaving Anza at the Gila junction, went up the Colorado to the Mojave region
with a few Indian servants, and after making important explorations in
California started eastward for Moqui, which he reached without any special
difficulty in July. The Moquis, however, would not admit him to their houses or
receive his gifts, cared not for his painting of heaven and hell, and refused
to kiss the image of Christ. After passing two nights in the courtyard he wrote a letter for the padre at Zuñi, returned in
sorrow to the Yamajabs, or Mojaves,
and went down the Colorado, finding his way to Bac in September. His was a
wonderful trip, though not very effective in respect of Moqui salvation.
It was in 1776 that Lieutenant-colonel Antonio Bonilla, of Coahuila,
embodied in a formal report, not only a résumé of New Mexico’s past history, but his views as to what should be done to
avert impending ruin. He believed that as a frontier outpost among gentile
tribes who had now lost all the fear and respect inspired by the first
conquerors, and who themselves used fire-arms and
horses, the holding of the province had an importance far beyond its direct
value as a Spanish possession, since if it were lost the savage hordes would
direct their whole force against Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora. Therefore a vigorous warfare should be waged by veteran troops from New Mexico as a centre.
It was also in 1776-7 that the northern provinces of Mexico were
organized as the Provincias Internas, under the Caballero de Croix as comandante
general, independent of the viceroy. This change and the following
complications of the military and civil status of the various districts have
but slight direct bearing on New Mexico, simply depriving the governor of his
title of captain-general, and making him subordinate at times to the comandante
general instead of the viceroy, and they cannot be properly presented here in
the space at my command; yet, as they are in a general sense an essential part
of the history of all the northern regions, I refer the reader to the annals of
Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora in the last quarter of the century, as compactly
presented in another volume of this series.
Governor Mendiuneta retired in March 1778,
leaving Francisco Trebol Navarro in command as acting
governor, but before the end of the year a successor came, in the person of
Lieutenant-colonel Juan Bautista de Anza, as political and military governor.
Anza, whose Californian expeditions have been noticed, was a native of Sonora,
a man of excellent ability and character, and of wide experience in Indian
warfare. He seems to have proved in every way worthy of the Caballero de
Croix’s high esteem; yet with all his energy he effected but slight change for
the better in New Mexican affairs. His first recorded enterprise was a campaign
against the Comanches with a force of 645 men, including 85 soldiers and 259
Indians. His course was north and north-east for some 95 leagues, and the
result was the killing of Cuerno Verde, the famous
Comanche chieftain, with four of his leading sub-chiefs, his high-priest, his eldest son and heir, and 32 of his
warriors.
Back from this campaign, Governor Anza gave his attention to the Moquis.
A failure of crops had reduced that people to such straits that the time was
deemed most favorable for their conversion, even Christianity being perhaps
preferable to starvation. Many of them were said to have abandoned their towns
to seek food in the mountains and among the Navajos, and these fugitives were
reported as disposed to submit, though the others still preferred death. It was
feared that if something were not done now all the Moquis might quit pueblo
life and join the hostile gentiles. Anza wrote repeatedly to Croix on the
prospects, enclosing letters from the padres, and advising that an effort
should be made either to establish missionaries at the towns, which would
require some additional force, or to induce the natives to migrate en masse and settle in new pueblos nearer the Spanish centres. In reply, the comandante general did not favor the
use of force, but advised that Anza on some pretext, as of an Apache campaign,
should visit the Moquis, give them some food, and persuade them, if possible,
to settle in New Mexico; otherwise the foundation
might be laid for future conversion. The governor continued his efforts, and in
August 1780 a message came that 40 families were ready to migrate if he would
come in person to bring them. He started in September with padres Fernandez and
Garcia, visiting all the towns, two of which were completely abandoned. The 40
families had been forced by hunger 15 days ago to go to the Navajo country,
where the men had been lulled and the women and children seized as slaves.
Moqui affairs were indeed in a sad condition. Escalante m 1775 had found 7,494
souls; now there were but 798; no rain had fallen in three years, and in that time deaths had numbered 6,698. Of 30,000 sheep 300
remained, and there were but five horses and no cattle. Only 500 fanegas of
maize and beans could be expected from the coming crop. Pestilence had aided
famine in the deadly work; raids from the Yutas and
Navajos had never ceased. There were those who believed their misfortunes a judgment
for their treatment of Padre Garcés in 1776. The
chief at Oraibe was offered a load of provisions to
relieve immediate wants, but he proudly declined the gift, as he had nothing to
offer in return. He refused to listen to the friars, and in reply to Anza’s
exhortations declared that as his nation was apparently doomed to
annihilation, the few who remained were resolved to die in their homes and in
their own faith. Yet his subjects were free to go and become Christians if they
chose to do so; and finally 30 families were induced
to depart with the Spaniards, including the chief of Gualpi.
I find no record as to what became of these converts, but I have an idea that
with them and others, a little later, the pueblo of Moquino, in the Laguna
region, may have been founded.
Not only among the Moquis did pestilence rage, but small-pox carried off 5,025 Indians of the mission pueblos in 1780-1; and in consequence
of this loss of population, Governor Anza, by consolidation, reduced the number
of missions, or of sínodos, to 20, a change which for
the next decade provoked much protest on the part of the friars. Pino, followed
by other authors, gives 1783 as the date of a long effective treaty with the
Comanches; but as he mentions the defeat of Cuerno Verde in the same connection, this may be a reference to an earlier event. In
1786 Viceroy Galvez, in his instructions to General Ugarte, introduced a new
Indian policy in the north, a policy of extermination, the main features of
which were to be unrelenting warfare on all tribes to secure treaties, free
trade and gifts to tribes at peace, the creation among the savages of needs
that could be supplied only by the Spaniards, the distribution of guns and
powder of inferior quality, the liberal use of spirituous liquors to demoralize
the Apaches, and constant efforts to promote a war of
extermination between the different tribes. Little or nothing appears
respecting the carrying-out of this policy in New
Mexico; but the instructions in some parts had special reference to that
province.
Lieutenant-colonel Manuel Flon came from Spain
in 1785 with a commission as governor, and started for
New Mexico; but there are no indications that he ever assumed the office.
Anza’s successor was Fernando de la Concha, who arrived after the middle of
1789, and ruled for a full term of five years. Concha was succeeded in 1794 by
Lieutenant-colonel Fernando Chacon, whose rule continued to the end of the
century and later. For the last years of the period I
find many items in the archives; but nearly all are of so trivial and
unimportant a nature that they are not worth reproduction. They relate almost
exclusively to Indian affairs, and seem to indicate
that all the tribes were behaving tolerably well, except the Apaches, against whom constant warfare was waged, with
results not clearly shown by the records.
Evidently not much had been effected in the way
of general reform; for in the last decade we have from the pen of Padre Juan
Agustin Morfi, not one of the New Mexican friars, an
able presentment of the country’s ills similar to those alluded to by earlier
writers. Chief among the evils to be remedied were the lack of order in Spanish
settlements, the houses being scattered, and the settlers beyond the reach of
law and religion, besides being exposed to Indian raids; a vicious system of
trade, and absence of money, of which more will be said presently; the free
admission of Spaniards and castas to live in
the Indian pueblos, these penniless intruders generally succeeding in making
the industrious native proprietors practically slaves through debt, or in
driving them away to live among the gentiles, the remedy being to forbid the
Spaniards to live in the pueblos or own property in them except by marriage;
the oppressive tyranny of the alcaldes mayores, more
fully noticed elsewhere in this chapter; and finally the unsettled and
unfortunate status of the Genízaros, or rescued
Indian captives.
Before 1750, as recorded in the preceding chapter, the padres were
charged by secular and ecclesiastic authorities with culpable neglect of their
duties as missionaries, notably in their failure to acquire the native
languages, or to speak Spanish to the Indians, the result being that their
preaching and religious instruction had no real effect, that the neophytes were
Christians only in name, and that confession of sins through interpreters was
generally postponed until the approach of death. While this matter did not in
this half-century assume a controversial aspect, yet the charges are sustained
by such evidence as exists. Bishop Tamaron in his
visit of 1760 had occasion at many points to administer severe reproof; and the
friars, while making various excuses for their remissness, denying some of its
worst results, and even promising reforms, did not claim the ability to communicate
with their neophytes, except through interpreters. Charges of neglect in other
matters, of oppressing the natives, of being frequently absent from their
posts, and of undue fondness for trade are not supported by any evidence of
this period.
It should be noted that the New Mexican missions were radically
different from the Californian establishments of later years. Practically,
except in being subject to their provincial and paid by the king, instead of
being under the bishop and supported by parochial fees, these friars were mere
parish priests in charge of Indian pueblos. There were no mission estates, no
temporalities managed by the padres, and except in petty matters of religious
observance the latter had no authority over the neophytes. At each pueblo the
padre had a church, where he preached, and taught, and said mass. With the
performance of these routine duties, and of those connected with baptism,
marriage, and burials, he was generally content. The Indians, for the most part
willingly, tilled a little piece of land for him, furnishing
also a few servants from week to week for his household service and that
of the church. He was in most instances a kind-hearted man, a friend of his
Indians, spending much of his salary on them or on the church. If sometimes
reproved by conscience for having lost something of the true Franciscan spirit,
he redoubled his zeal in petty parish duties for a time, bethought him of
adverse circumstances and of the ‘costumbre del país,’ and relapsed into the customary inertia. If reproved
by the governor or bishop or provincial—for even the latter occasionally
complained that the New Mexican friars were beyond his control—he had stored up
in his memory no end of plausible excuses and countercharges. The Indians were
in no sense Christians, but they liked the padres in comparison with other Spaniards, and were willing to comply with certain harmless
church formalities, which they neither understood nor cared to understand. They
had lost all hope of successful revolt, but were
devotedly attached to their homes and their ancestral ways of pueblo life;
dreaded apostasy, because it involved a precarious existence among hostile
tribes of savages; and thus, as a choice of evils, they lived and died as
nominal Christians and Spanish subjects, or perhaps more properly slaves.
Countercharges of the friars against the governors and alcaldes mayores, as embodied in Padre Delgado’s letter of 1750,
were repeated in this period, especially in an exhaustive report of the
provincial, Padre Pedro Serrano, in 1761, which included long quotations from a
letter of Padre Yaro, the custodio,
and from statements of other friars. The last governors, Cachupin,
Marin del Valle, and Mendoza, are represented as the worst, but all as
speculating tyrants, without skill or experience in matters of Indian warfare
or government, habitually sending to Mexico reports of campaigns never
performed, bent only on enriching themselves, treating the pueblo Indians most
inhumanly as slaves, using their women and all female captives for the
gratification of their lusts, cheating the gentiles, and by outrageous
treatment keeping alive their hostility. The alcaldes are mere tools or
accomplices of the governors, and jueces de residencia are also in the ring of oppressors. The Indians are the chief
victims of these rascals; but the Spanish settlers are hardly less unfortunate,
and even the soldiers are cheated out of half their pay. The padres are the
objects of hatred, and if they open their mouths in protest are by perjured and
suborned testimony made the victims of outrageous calumnies, their reports to
Mexico being intercepted on the way. The partisan bitterness and prejudice of
the writers, with their allusions to offences, terrible only in the eyes of
friars, and the sickening cant and priestly verbiage in which they clothe their
charges, indicate clearly enough that the accusations are too sweeping, and
often grossly over-colored; yet enough of candor and honest evidence remains to
justify the conclusion that New Mexican affairs were in a sad plight, and that
the pueblo Indians were little better than slaves. With all their shortcomings,
the padres were better men than their enemies. After 1761 not much is heard
against the governors, though the friars were not able to prevent the
reappointment of Cachupin. Probably there were
reforms in some directions under the later rulers; but if we may credit Padre Morfi’s statements, the condition of the Indians was but
slightly bettered, since the alcaldes mayores,
through the creation of debts, a vicious commercial system, and various abuses
of their official authority, still kept the natives in
their power as before.
The population of pueblo Indians decreased by about 2,400 during these
50 years, local particulars and approximately exact figures being presented in
the final note of this chapter. Of mission history proper in addition to what
has been given in other connections, there is little to be said. In 1767 the
four establishments of Santa Fé, La Cañada, Albuquerque, and El Paso were
ordered to be put under secular curates, and this was perhaps done, though
later records seem to indicate that friars were still stationed at those
places. The founding of a missionary college was ordered by the king and pope
in 1777-9, but nothing was accomplished. In consequence of the small-pox
epidemic of 1780-1, as we have seen, the number of missions was reduced by
consolidation in 1782, Jemes, Santa Ana, Acoma, Nambé, Tesuque, Pecos, San Felipe, and San Ildefonso being
reduced to the condition of visitas, a saving of
about $4,000 in sínodos being thus effected.
The friars were naturally displeased, and down to the end of the century were
constant in their efforts to obtain an increase of missionaries, or of
salaries, or the privilege of collecting parochial taxes, but without success.
In addition to some references and particulars of these and other matters, I
give in the appended note a list of friars serving in 1751-1800, including all
the names I have found in the various documents consulted, but doubtless far
from being complete.
New Mexican industries were agriculture, stock-raising, and barter.
There was no mining, though occasional indications of mineral wealth were
found. Manufactures, beyond the preparation of skins for home use or a southern
market, the weaving of cotton in small quantities at a few pueblos, and the
making of pottery at others, were confined to the fabrication of coarse woollen blankets by the pueblo Indians. Agricultural
products, chiefly from irrigated lands, were maize, wheat, and beans in the
north, or New Mexico proper, with a little cotton, fruits for home consumption,
and an inferior species of tobacco known as punche;
while the southern district of El Paso was famous for its fruit orchards,
vineyards, wine, and aguardiente. Of live-stock, sheep formed the chief
element, these animals being raised in large numbers, both for their wool and
meat, though there are no reliable statistics extant. Horses and cattle wore
also raised, but the former were always scarce in the
province on account of the numbers sold to and stolen by the wild Indians. I
find no definite indications that cattle were raised to any great extent for
their hides and tallow.
But all was subordinate to the commercial industry, and all trade was cambalache, or barter. Each year in July or August the
people met the Comanches and other tribes of the plains at Taos, where a grand
fair was held. Some trade was done at other frontier points, and
also by citizens and pueblo Indians, who went out in various directions
to meet customers, but this was discouraged and at times forbidden. To this
fair the wandering gentiles brought skins of deer and buffalo, with Indian
captives to barter for knives and other iron implements, horses, beads, and
trinkets, and to some extent blankets. At the end of the year the New Mexicans
went in caravans, sometimes of 500 men, to attend the January fair at
Chihuahua, where they exchanged the skins, Indian servants, blankets, and to
slight extent other products of the province for cloths, groceries, and various
articles for the year’s Indian trade. The value of each year’s exports was
estimated by the comandante general in 1788 at $30,000. The departure and
return of the caravan were the great events of the year. In 1776 the governor
delayed the publication of an important bando till the people had returned from
their ‘ordinaria anual salida’; and the provincial in 1788 explains the
impossibility of obtaining reports from New Mexico until the people come down
to the January fair. There was no trade as yet with
the French in Louisiana, or with the Spaniards in Texas. There was no coin or
other money in New Mexico, but the traders for their accounts invented a system
of imaginary currency, including four kinds of dollars—pesos de plata, worth eight reales; pesos
de proyecto, six reales; pesos antiguos, four reales;
and pesos de la tierra, two reales. The beauty
of this system was that the traders always bought for the cheap pesos and sold
for the dearer kinds, all being ‘dollars’ to the Indians. Profits were
enormous, a trader by two or three barters in a year
often getting $64 for a piece of cloth which cost him six. Advantage was also
taken of the Indians’ weakness for baubles and ignorance of their real value. Señor Trebol bought a guacamaya, or macaw, for eight dollars, and sold the gay
feathers for $492. Another system of swindling commerce was the habitual
selling of goods to be paid for in future products. Thus, for a little seed
grain six fanegas at harvest were promised; or for a bottle of brandy in holy
week a barrel was exacted. The natives through debt became practically slaves,
besides losing their land, and the poor settlers were hardly less the victims
of commercial oppression. While the settlers and pueblo Indians were always in
debt to the traders, the latter in turn were debtors to or agents for Chihuahua
merchants, who thus monopolized all the profits, and nothing was left for New
Mexico, except for certain traders, who as alcaldes mayores utilized their political authority for private gain. Padre Morfi’s proposed remedy for these evils was the encouragement of home manufactures by
sending artisan teachers and machinery to the province, with a view to render
the inhabitants independent of Chihuahua. His plan was to send criminals of the
better class, whose offences were chiefly due to drink and the temptations of a
city, from Mexico to the far north, and through them to reform the New Mexican
industrial system. This expedient was tried in California later without any
brilliant success.
The population in 1750 has been given as 3,779 Spaniards and 12,142
pueblo Indians, a total of 13,521 in New Mexico proper, or 18,721 including the
district of El Paso. In 1760 official reports show that the number of Spaniards
had increased to 7,666, that of Indians decreased to 9,104, and the total was
16,770, or 21,752 including El Paso. Down to 1788 there was slight change in
the figures, but in the final decade there was an inexplicable doubling of the
Spanish population; and at the end of the century the figures stood as follows:
Spaniards, including of course the castas or
negroes and mixed breeds, 18,826, Indians 9,732, total 28,558, or, including El
Paso, 34,138.